Introduction
Here is a vivid account of the pre-Judicature Act system which prevailed in New South Wales at the end of the nineteenth century and its origins:
To the litigant who sought damages before an Equity Judge, a grant of Probate before a Divorce Judge or an injunction before a Common Law Judge, there could be no remedy. He had come to the wrong Court, so it was said. He might well have enquired on what historical basis he could thus be denied justice. It cannot be questioned that the Court required specialization to function properly and that a case obviously falling within one jurisdiction ought not to be heard by a Judge sitting in another jurisdiction. Yet from this the fallacious extension was made that a Judge sitting in one jurisdiction could not in any circumstances hear a case which ought to have originated in another jurisdiction. 1 The words are those of the distinguished Australian legal historian J.M. Bennett. There is no doubt that the jurisdictions at common law and in equity came to be treated in many respects as if they were separate courts, despite the failure of sustained efforts to create a separate equity court; despite it being clear that there was a single Supreme Court of New South Wales with full jurisdiction at common law and in equity; and despite efforts by its first Chief Justice, Sir Francis Forbes, in the opposite direction. But was that a 'fallacious extension '? 2 If that conclusion is to be drawn, it requires a careful assessment of incremental developments throughout the nineteenth [119] century -some of which were directed to separating common law from equity, but others to assimilating the two jurisdictions.
The historical position in New South Wales may be of some wider importance. Judicial and academic scholarship from New South Wales has been prominent in the efflorescence of equity in the decades M Leeming, "Fusion-Fission-Fusion: Pre-Judicature Equity Jurisdiction in New South Wales 1824-1972 in J Goldberg et al (eds), Equity and Law: Fusion and Fission (Cambridge UP 2019), 118-143.
Secondly, the Judicature legislation was not just about equity. The Judicature legislation changed a small number of conflicting rules -for example, by permitting the Court of Admiralty's 'halfdamages under the both-to-blame rule' 10 in collision cases to prevail over the common law's complete defence of contributory negligence.
11
This had nothing to do with equity at all, but was made necessary when a single court was to determine all collision cases. The Judicature legislation also introduced a small number of significant innovations (for example, by authorising a general mode for the assignment at law of choses in action), 12 while confirming some long established rules (for example, that a trustee could not plead a limitation statute). 13 Thirdly, it is at least arguable that the most important practical change was procedural -the assimilation of very different procedural rules between the common law and chancery courts. 14 Prior to 1 November 1875, every aspect of procedure was different. Before 1854, discovery could only be obtained in [121] equity (necessitating the filing of a separate bill), and even after a power was conferred on common law courts in 1854, evidence suggests it was not used to its fullest extent. 15 The mode of trial (with a jury at common law) was different, while appeals were much more widely available in equity. As the Judicature Commission said in 1869:
[T]he forms of pleadings are different, the modes of trial and of taking evidence are different, the nomenclature is different, the same instrument being called by a different name in different Courts; almost every step in the cause is different. 14 There is a measure of simplification in this. The superior courts at common law had, until 1832, all themselves employed different originating process, until by the Uniformity of Process Act 1832 (2 Wm. IV c. 39) replaced by a single writ on which the form of action was required to be stated. It was said at the time that this was 'to put to an end the perplexity and frequent errors occasioned by the great variety of process antecedently in use': see J. Chitty, Sir Roger Therry, writing in 1863, and who had been Attorney-General of New South Wales twenty years earlier, wrote:
A part of the duty of the Attorney-General (or at least it was so during my tenure of that office) is to attend to the Acts of each session of the British Parliament, and apprise the local Government of such measures as might advantageously be adopted and declared to extend to New South Wales. Why was it different in the case of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, one of the oldest continually existing superior courts in the common law world, which at all times has enjoyed full common law and equitable jurisdiction?
Equity jurisdiction in New South Wales
One remarkable aspect of the Judicature legislation in New South Wales is that it was necessary at all. From 1824, there was a single Supreme Court with plenary jurisdiction at common law and in equity. Yet, as Bennett observed, 26 that did not stand in the way of the introduction and assimilation of the very features of the English legal system -the separation of common law and equitable jurisdictionswhich were done away with by the judicature legislation. It is that process of fission, creating separate common law and equity jurisdictions within the same court, which gives rise to the title of this paper. This section describes how it occurred.
This section proceeds chronologically. It addresses the creation of the modern Supreme Court in 1824, the early period from 1824-1838, 1838-1841 (a tumultuous period associated with the tenure of Justice John Walpole Willis, the creation of the office of 'Primary Judge in Equity' and the first equity rules), the period 1841-1880 leading up to the enactment of the Equity Act 1880 27 and its interpretation, and the position in the mid twentieth century, before the Judicature legislation commenced in 1972. Anticipating the Judicature legislation by precisely five decades, a wide civil jurisdiction at common law and in equity was conferred the Supreme Court of New South Wales over all matters excluding matrimonial causes.
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The New South Wales Act provided (section 2) that the Supreme Court was to be a court of record with a complete common law jurisdiction defined by reference to the superior courts of law at Westminster, and (section 9) that the court should be a Court of Equity with all the power and authority of the Lord High Chancellor. and whose common injunction was 'universally understood, in the profession, to be more beneficially comprehensive than that which issues from the Court of Chancery'. 35 Accordingly, there was never a need to abolish existing courts and to create a single new court of common law and equitable jurisdiction; that existed from the beginning. What was ultimately necessary was legislation to override the lack of jurisdiction, initially merely perceived, later enshrined in law, limiting the common law 'side' of the Court from hearing and determining equitable claims and vice versa.
The period from 1824 -1838
The first Chief Justice, Sir Francis Forbes, is widely and rightly known for simplifying the procedure in the Supreme Court in the young colony. He had not been burdened by a junior's practice at the Bar, with its inevitable focus upon procedure. As John Bryson has pointed out, Forbes C.J. took considerable steps to simplify and assimilate equitable procedure in what was, in the 1820s and 1830s, a very minor part of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
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This was a reaction, in part, to unduly complex procedures introduced by Barron Field, which Forbes said the public 'might be excused for believing, were not so operative in facilitating the ends of justice, as in filling the pockets 
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Thus it is that it may said, at a high level, that it was only after Forbes C.J.'s departure that steps were taken to bring about a jurisdictional separation between common law and equity within the same court. The actual position is more nuanced.
In the first months of his tenure, Forbes C.J. preserved the procedure which had evolved under the Second Charter. However, he intimated in court on 13 December 1824 that he had received instructions that 'on the equity, as well as the plea side of the Court, the practice should be assimilated to that of England, after the end of the present Term'. 40 That reflected advance notice of the Order in Council conferring rule-making power upon Forbes C.J. That in itself was an innovation, which had been sought by the reform movement in England and America; New South Wales was the first colony in which such a grant was made. 41 However, the power was qualified by the requirement that:
such Rules and Orders … shall be consistent with, and similar to, the Law and Practice of His Majesty's Supreme Courts at Westminster, so far as the Condition and Circumstances of the said Colony will admit.
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Even in January 1825, the separate jurisdictions of the Supreme Court were reflected in the rules. Rule 2 was that:
the Proceedings of the said Supreme Court, within its several and respective Jurisdictions as aforesaid, be commenced and continued in a distinct and separate Form.
The reference to the same court having 'several and respective Jurisdictions' was a natural consequence of a rule-making power which required assimilation to English practice where there were 42 New South Wales, Supreme Court, Rules of the Supreme Court, 22 June 1825, Preamble. The rules were printed in the Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, 23 June 1825, 1. Forbes had been pressing for a resolution of the problem of the lack of Rules and the absence of any power to make them. He had advised that it would be better if the power were delegated to himself, the Chief Justice, subject to the power of revocation in London: 'pray do not fetter us too much, for be assured we can do the thing better here, than it can be done at home -you cannot command our local knowledge and experience, without which it will be next to impossible to legislate beneficially': 14 August 1824, letter from Forbes to Wilmot Horton, quoted by Dorsett, 'Procedural Innovation', 130. confirmed that the 'rules and orders, forms and manner of practice and proceeding' in, relevantly, the High Court of Chancery, shall 'be adopted and followed' so far as the circumstances and condition of the colony shall require and admit. 44 That was reflected in judgments. As Forbes C.J. put it:
The general rules of the Equity courts of England were in force here so far as they were applicable to the state of the Colony and its juridical establishment. 45 The rule that proceedings in the court's 'several and respective Jurisdictions' be kept distinct was continued as rule 2 of the 1831 rules and rule 14 of the 1834 rules. This had substantive, rather than merely procedural, consequences. In an action in ejectment to recover possession of land in Burwood in 1832, Forbes C.J., Stephen and Dowling JJ. said, anticipating the future separation of jurisdiction, that the matter 'must be determined strictly according to the rules of law, and we are precluded in the present mode of proceeding from any equitable considerations'. 
1838-1841 -John Walpole Willis and the Primary Judge in Equity
The period from 1838-1841 was immensely important in leading to the fission of common law and equitable jurisdiction. The catalyst for change was a new judge, Justice John Walpole Willis.
Unlike his judicial brethren, Willis J. had practised extensively in equity at the English Bar. He was of considerable ability, and had published three textbooks on equity. 47 It was not surprising that he would take the lead in equity [127] business. With his arrival in February 1838, there seems to have commenced a process of specialisation. The Governor wrote in an official despatch that 'Mr Justice Willis, having been in England at the Chancery Bar, has almost invariably up to the present time heard singly all cases in Equity'. 48 It is necessary, in order to understand the legislative separation of jurisdiction which took place in 1840, to say something about the character of Willis J. He has been said to be 'as troublesome a judge as could be imagined'. Earl of Strathmore had been ended by Act of Parliament in 1833, he had been appointed to the Kings Bench in Upper Canada through the influence of his then father-in-law, but had been 'amoved' two years later under the Colonial Leave of Absence Act 1782, 50 following a series of disputes after the rejection of his proposal to establish a separate chancery court. The Privy Council affirmed the amotion, but the order was later set aside. 51 Willis then served as Vice-President of the Court of Civil and Criminal Justice of British Guiana, before being appointed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
General rules in equity were drafted by the newly arrived Willis J. in 1838. Consistently with the terms of the rule-making power, they commenced with the command that the rules and orders in Chancery were to be followed so far as local circumstances would admit.
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Rule 5 made provision for injunctions for the stay of proceedings at law, and rule 22 authorised a petition for rehearing before all the judges 'as prescribed by the English Rules of Practice for a petition of re-hearing by the Lord Chancellor of England, of a case previously heard and decided by the Master of the Rolls or Vice Chancellor in that Kingdom'. Thus from the beginning (filing originating process) until the end (appeals) the rules replicated the procedure in England, notwithstanding at all times the plaintiff was litigating in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
[128] Just as he had in Canada, so too in New South Wales, Willis J. advocated the creation of a separate court, with himself at its head, as Chief Baron. 
Deficiencies in the drafting of section 20 soon became manifest. In the following year, the Advancement of Justice Act 1841 55 authorised judges other than the judge appointed to sit in Equity, in cases of his absence or illness, to 'sit alone and hear and determine all causes and matters in Equity in like manner ', 56 and altered the appeal structure, so that appeals were heard by the three judges in Sydney (which is to say, including the judge at first instance).
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The legislation 'made for the first time in the Colony's legal history a division in the function of the Court', 58 resulting in one judge of the Supreme Court, the Primary Judge in Equity, being at first exclusively, and then primarily, responsible for hearing and determining all proceedings of a particular subject matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. give evidence viva voce, and many other matters. 63 Governor Gipps amoved him by order dated 17 June 1843. 64 Justice Willis' legacy included not merely the office of Primary Judge in Equity, whose jurisdiction and decisions were different from those of other members of the Court. In addition, and presumably with the intention of confining Willis J's activities to the Port Phillip District, the Administration of Justice Act 1841 contained provisions vesting exclusive geographic jurisdiction in different judges of the Court. Section 1 conferred exclusive common law and equitable jurisdiction on the Resident Judge over 'persons residing and property situate within Port Phillip', with the Judges of the Supreme Court at Sydney having exclusive jurisdiction over persons residing and property situate elsewhere in the Colony. Section 4 created a concurrent jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases within 25 miles of the border. Those distinctions [130] disappeared after the colony of Victoria was carved out of New South Wales in 1851, although until then, the exclusive jurisdiction went beyond even the concurrent equitable jurisdiction then exercised by the palatine courts. 65 However, the recurring theme -that different judges exercised different jurisdictions within the same Court -may be seen as a further example of the process whereby at the same time English courts were being unified, their New South Wales counterpart was being divided.
-1880 -separate jurisdictions at law and in equity
In England, the middle decades of the nineteenth century amounted to a period of almost continual reform, leading to substantial improvements in common law and chancery procedure. The caricature described by Dickens in Bleak House was perceived at the time to depict a system that no longer prevailed. 67 However, in New South Wales, the Equity registry and the Primary Judge in Equity came close to grinding to a halt. 64 Once again, without notice to him, leading to another appeal to the Privy Council, which declared that he was entitled to notice, although there had been cause for his amoval: Willis v. Gipps (1846) 5 Moo. P.C. 379; 13 E.R. 536. He was not reinstated to any judicial office. He was described by the clerk in the Colonial Office responsible for New South Wales as 'one of the weakest men I ever knew … He has within my knowledge been ruined three or four times over by sheer vanity and an absurd self-importance': CO 201/306, folio 446a, cited by Bennett, Sir James Dowling, 128. For one thing, there seems not to have been much work. Dowling said at the time that 'the amount of [equity business] pending was very small compared with other branches of jurisdiction'. 68 The rules made on 28 October 1844 stated that the Primary Judge would sit in Equity on every Saturday during Term, save on the last Saturday, and every Tuesday during the Vacation. One judge sitting one day a week suggests that significantly less than [131] 10% of judicial resources were devoted to Equity. That is consistent with the provision made for appeals to be set down for the Friday and Saturday in the week preceding each Term (i.e., all appeals could be dealt with in no more than two days).
A snapshot of practice may be obtained from Alfred Stephen's Introduction to the Practice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, published in 1843. 69 The author, who was well placed to do so, described the nature of the 1840 and 1841 Acts as a delegation of jurisdiction, rather than a transfer, as follows: That reasoning did not prevent the establishment of a body of law holding that there were separate jurisdictions at law and in equity. Bennett states that: 74 With a large recruitment to the colonial legal profession of practitioners accustomed to the strict Common Law/Chancery division in England, the Colony's 'equity division' came to be regarded, without justification in terms of history or practice, as equivalent to the Chancellor's Court.
[132] Typical of the mid-nineteenth century approach was the Full Court's decision in Bank of Australasia v. Murray.
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The Full Court (Stephen C.J., Dickinson and Therry JJ.) dismissed an appeal from Therry J., the Primary Judge in Equity. The Court said, of the defendant to the suit in equity:
He might, therefore, have been sued at law; and we can perceive no reason why he should not have been. So, if he be still liable, he is liable at law; and the resort to a Court of Equity was unnecessary. but only where they would be a complete answer to the common law claim. Thereafter, from 1857 until 1958, in circumstances where an absolute verdict in favour of the party asserting the equitable plea or replication would be impossible (say, because equitable relief would only be available on terms), it remained necessary to seek a common injunction (just as it had in England between 1854 and 1875).
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The enactment of the Equity Act 1880
From around the middle of the nineteenth century, equity litigation declined. A number of causes appear to have contributed to this. Undoubtedly one was the procedural technicality and complexity (and accompanying expense and delay). Another was the perception that equity business always came last. Sir Alfred Stephen described Equity as 'an unfavoured child -kicked, it might be said, from one 
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room to another until it ran the risk of being utterly neglected'.
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A recurring theme in the evidence given to a Select Committee in 1857, including by judges and practitioners, was the delays and inefficiencies in the Primary Judge's time being absorbed by other work -so [133] much so that all members of the Supreme Court urged the creation of a separate Equity court, in a separate building, so that "it would be impossible for Counsel to run from one to the other".
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Sir Alfred Stephen accepted that a separate court would form "an additional difficulty in the way of a future amalgamation of [the] two branches", but was firmly opposed to such a step: "I do not believe that a complete amalgamation of the two jurisdictions ever will take place; and I am one of those who think that it never can." 
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chairmanship of Stephen C.J. One of its purposes was to propose amendments with a view 'to the removal of the inconveniences arising from the separation of jurisdictions at Law and in Equity'. 88 Although the Equity Act 1880 was often described as 'Darley's Equity Act', it was in fact a draft proposed by William Owen, a leading equity junior who supplied it to the Law Reform Commission in 1870. The bill was twice unsuccessfully introduced in 1870. It was enacted, in substantially the same form, a decade later, the position before the Primary Judge in Equity having deteriorated. Owen gave evidence in 1880 to a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly that the Equity jurisdiction was 'ruinous to suitors and not in accord with the judicial progress of the age'. Lord Selborne's Judicature Bill was read a second time on Tuesday, amid a perfect chorus of approval from all the legal personages in the House. Lord Hatherley concurred with Lord Selborne from beginning to end; Lord Chelmsford regarded the bill as a great and comprehensive measure; and Lord Romilly held it to be the first which had promised to be really effective.
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It is impossible to determine why it was decided to enact Owen's draft bill, rather than to follow the more extensive reforms enacted at Westminster. Where in the 1830's complete reliance was placed on English precedent, it is found that by the 1880's colonial lawyers were disinclined to follow slavishly the extensive reforms of the English courts. It may never be known with certainty whether that disinclination was bred of sloth or of individualism. 1 and 2 had 362 and 407 pages devoted to cases at law, and only 85 and 82 pages on cases in equity. A decade later, volumes 11 and 12 in 1890 and 1891 had 489 and 337 pages on cases at law, and 335 and 329 pages on cases in equity, many with a distinctly commercial flavour. A less subjective approach may be seen from the relative growth in filings after 1881.
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That success is partly attributable to two distinguished equity judges: Sir William Manning and William Owen. On the resignation of Owen C.J. in Eq. in 1896, 95 it was said that he had 'raised this Court to an eminence it had never before attained'.
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The Equity Act 1880 repeated the power to appoint one of the judges the 'Primary Judge in Equity' in order 'to exercise the jurisdiction of the said Court in Equity ', 97 and then defined the 'Court' for the purposes of the Act 'to mean the Court holden before the Judge so appointed'. 98 However, it also included provisions based on the mid-nineteenth century reforms, including, in sections 4 and 32, equivalents to Sir John Rolt's Act of 1862 (permitting the determination oflegal titles and rights) and Lord Cairns' Act of 1858 [136] (authorising an order for damages in addition to or in liue of an injunction or specific performance).
Three things may be seen in this legislation. The first to note is that the premise of those provisions was that there was an inhibition upon making findings of legal title in 'any suit or proceeding in Equity'. To that extent, the section amounts to a legislative entrenchment of the limitations which had been held to attach to the separate equity court identified in sections 1, 2 and 3.
The second is that nowhere in the Equity Act 1880 was there a provision analogous to the Judicature provisions enacted in 1873, vesting all jurisdiction in a single court. That reflects in part the fact that although enacted in 1880, it had been drafted 10 years earlier. It may also reflect the scepticism of the (now retired) Stephen C.J., who still sat in the Legislative Council.
The third is that section 4 might be construed, if read literally, to prevent a suitor being struck out for commencing in the wrong jurisdiction. After some initial uncertainty, This section of the Act, which was passed after the Judicature Act in England, was certainly intended by the draftsman (for I drew the section myself), and presumably was intended by the Legislature, to give to the Court of Equity as wide and complete jurisdiction in all matters that came before it as the Court of Chancery had under the Judicature Act. The subsequent sections, 32 to 37, of the Equity Act are taken from the English Act, 21 and 22 Vic c 27 (known as Cairns's Act). Section 32 empowers the Court to grant damages in all cases in which the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an injunction against a breach of contract or against the commission or continuance of any wrongful act, or for specific performance of any contract, either in addition to or in substitution for such injunction or specific performance. I think that section 4 must be read in connection with section 32. The latter section only gives the Court a limited power to grant damages. If this Court, [137] under section 4, had power to entertain suits in respect of breaches of contract in the same way as Courts of common law, it would have been unnecessary to have conferred the power under section 32. But as those powers are expressly given, and only to a limited extent, I think the Court's jurisdiction as to damages must be measured by the limits under section 32, and not by the plenary powers under section 4. Decisions upon this section have imposed a limitation upon the apparent generality of its closing words. The section does not make the Court a Court of law, but only empowers the Court to decide common law questions incidentally arising in an equity suit. The plaintiff must establish some recognised equitable ground for coming to the Court, and then all questions, whether legal or equitable, arising in the suit can be determined …
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The old practice has been universally condemned and reformed years ago in England. The system established by this new Act will do much to assimilate the practice and procedure on the Equity side of the Supreme Court to that on the Common Law side. This alone is a beneficial reform, it being difficult to see any good reason for having two entirely different systems of procedure in two branches or divisions of the one Supreme Court. The Act goes far towards effecting a fusion of Law and Equity. Thus, if a suit were commenced in Equity, it was necessary for a plaintiff to 'shew some equitable grounds for coming to this Court'. Conversely, as A.H. Simpson J. said in Merrick v. Ridge:
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[I]f a plaintiff's suit is really a common law action disguised in the form of an equity suit, I am bound to give effect to the objection that he has not come to the proper Court for his relief. 108 This paper does not chart the course of the ensuing decisions of the High Court, which ultimately accepted what had been established by the Supreme Court as to the separate jurisdictions at law and in equity. 109 At one time, it seemed that the High Court would dispel the fission which had developed between the common law and equitable jurisdictions of the Supreme Court, but that did not occur.
[138] The position by the middle of the twentieth century By the middle of the twentieth century, the long serving Chief Justice, Sir Frederick Jordan, could write that 'it is still of common occurrence for a Judge of the Supreme Court sitting in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to have occasion to grant an injunction restraining a party from proceeding at nisi prius before another Judge of the same Court'. 110 The same Chief Justice had, in Coroneo v. Australian Provincial Assurance Association Ltd, 111 dismissed a mortgagor's complaint against the exercise of his mortgagee's power of sale at a gross undervalue because it had been brought at common law. Conversely, in Hawdon v. Khan,
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Street C.J. in Eq. said that a statement of claim seeking injunctions against the repeated trespass on land the plaintiff claimed to own was in substance 'an action of ejectment triable, not on this side of the Court, but in its Common Law jurisdiction', and upheld the defendant's demurrer. 113 One of the last legislative reforms prior to the adoption of the Judicature system occurred in 1957, when provision was made for orders that 'the action be transferred into the jurisdiction of the Court in equity', and, conversely, for an order that a suit or proceeding in equity be transferred into the 107 achievements in the age of fusion was its explanation of the true character of 'fusion' and its exposure of fallacies on that subject. 139 Those criticisms, principally of decisions of the English Court of Appeal, which was highly persuasive but which did not bind Australian courts, 140 encouraged independence of thinking and discipline in the development of the law.
In the longer term, the book influenced Australian law schools, whose number was shortly to expand exponentially. As Dyson Heydon has put it:
[The work] arrested the decay of equity in university law schools. These grew rapidly in number and in population from the late 1960s on throughout the country. In the law schools there was massive pressure to reduce or keep compulsory courses to a minimum in order to accommodate a greater number of optional courses conforming to contemporary quarantehuitard tastes. Equity was a prime candidate for jettison or dismemberment. In places where equity was compulsory, Equity: Doctrines and [R]emedies caused it to remain compulsory; in places where it was optional, its status did not decline further. To some extent the subject was restored as a field of wide interest among academic lawyers, this being assisted by the writings of P.D. Finn, particularly Fiduciary Obligations (1977). 141 The result in the twenty-first century is a legal environment in New South Wales where the teaching and practice of equity flourishes. Within the universities, as indicated in the passage reproduced above, in 1992 the Law Admissions Consultative Committee identified 11 areas, Equity being one, whose study was mandatory in order to obtain admission as a legal practitioner. That list now has statutory force. 142 Most law schools at Australian universities accordingly teach Equity as a compulsory undergraduate course. Within legal practice, two superficial measures of the vibrancy of equity may be noted. The first is that the database maintained by the New South Wales [143] Bar Association presently lists 569 barristers who claim to practise in 'Equity', from a total of 2,506.
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The second is that a great deal of commercial litigation in Australia takes place in the "Commercial List" within the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
It may readily be acknowledged that many other forces have been at work. However, the matters outlined above are at least indirect consequences of the delayed enactment of the Judicature legislation in New South Wales.
Conclusions
The principal question addressed by this paper is how within New South Wales there was a fission of jurisdiction in the nineteenth century, in contrast with the fusion elsewhere in the world. Like most historical developments, it was the product of a series of small steps, the significance of many of which would not have been apparent at the time. With the utmost respect to Dr Bennett, it simplifies
